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I. INTRODUCTION 
“[T]he Fourth Amendment must keep pace with the inexorable march 
of technological progress, or its guarantees will wither and perish.”1 
Recent and rapid technological change requires the Supreme Court to 
update Fourth Amendment2 jurisprudence for the twenty-first century.3 
Unfortunately, the Fourth Amendment is outdated for a world that relies on 
communications facilitated by third-party intermediaries. The protection (or 
lack thereof) of these communications sits on unsettled ground. Consider the 
following:  
a. A text message sent to a friend letting her know you are on your way. 
b. A two-month chain of emails sent to contractors building your new 
house.  
c. A Facebook post updating your “friends” as you travel on vacation.  
d. The search terms entered into your Google search in the past week.  
Each of these illustrates a communication sent through an intermediary party. 
Do the senders have a reasonable expectation of privacy in these 
communications?4 Federal courts are grappling with this question,5 and the 
Supreme Court has provided no clear guidance on the issue.  
                                                                                                                     
 1 United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 285 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 2 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no [w]arrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”). 
 3 See infra Part II.  
 4 “Reasonable expectation of privacy” is the standard used when determining if a 
Fourth Amendment violation has occurred. See infra Part II.A. 
 5 In a recent Fourth Amendment case, one judge stated: “[C]ellular (not to mention 
internet) communication has left courts struggling to determine if (and how) existing tests 
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Because of this uncertainty, privacy in digital communications currently 
lies at two extremes—neither of which produces desirable results. At one 
extreme, courts strictly apply the third-party doctrine and remove all privacy 
protections from digital communications.6 Under this theory, the sender 
knowingly exposes information to a third-party and thus has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy over the communication. At the other extreme, courts 
distinguish between “address” and “content” information and determine 
privacy protection based on this classification.7  
These competing solutions leave much to be desired. The first solution 
(the third-party doctrine) does not protect the many digital conversations 
Americans have in everyday life. The second solution extends the established 
address/content distinction too far, and may lead to problems that are more 
difficult to resolve in the future.  
If the Supreme Court desires to protect digital communications (as it 
should), a much better solution is available: the mosaic theory. The mosaic 
theory finds that when law enforcement aggregates small amounts of 
information, it creates a clear picture of an individual’s intimate details and 
thus violates an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.8 For example, 
one email may not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy, but many 
months of emails may collectively possess a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.  
Applying the mosaic theory to digital communications strikes a middle 
ground between the two current extremes. This solution allows the third-party 
doctrine to remain intact, and simultaneously protects large amounts of 
information sent through digital intermediaries. Further, this solution presents 
a flexible framework that courts can apply to future technology. 
Revising the Fourth Amendment framework for digital communications 
will have a lasting effect on the privacy enjoyed—or not enjoyed—in the 
coming decades. Future Fourth Amendment decisions will affect information 
stored in “the cloud;”9 communications sent through social media platforms 
such as Facebook,10 Snapchat,11 and Tinder;12 financial information sent 
through Venmo;13 and forms of electronic communication not yet imagined.  
                                                                                                                     
apply or whether new tests should be framed.” United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 
894 (6th Cir. 2016) (Stranch, J., concurring); see also infra Part III.  
 6 See infra Part III.A. 
 7 See infra Part III.B. 
 8 See infra Part II.B.  
 9 “The cloud” is a phrase used to describe a network of servers that have the ability 
to run applications, deliver services, and store large amounts of data in connection with 
certain personal accounts. See Jess Fee, The Beginner’s Guide to the Cloud, MASHABLE 
(Aug. 26, 2013), http://mashable.com/2013/08/26/what-is-the-cloud/#DcaJ.uiPJkqq 
[https://perma.cc/L7Q9-MZLP]. 
 10 Facebook is a social media platform that strives to connect friends and family. See 
Company Info, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM, https://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ 
[https://perma.cc/TXA9-AJZB]. 
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This Note examines digital communications and the feasibility of 
resolving current and future privacy issues using the mosaic theory. Part II 
surveys the background and development of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. Part III examines the existing methods of analyzing digital 
communications and critiques those frameworks. Part IV proposes that courts 
use the mosaic theory to determine when the Fourth Amendment protects 
digital communications and addresses counterarguments to this approach. 
Part V concludes.  
II. EXAMINING THE PAST TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS OF THE FUTURE: A 
QUICK LOOK AT THE DEVELOPMENT OF FOURTH AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE 
To examine the future of the Fourth Amendment, it is important to first 
understand the conceptual underpinnings of the Fourth Amendment.  
A. Katz and the Elusive Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from certain government 
searches; it ensures that law enforcement cannot enter the home, search mail, 
or arbitrarily seize property. However, the Fourth Amendment is not all-
encompassing. Over the past century, the Supreme Court has defined the limits 
of Fourth Amendment protection.  
Modern Fourth Amendment framework began in 1967 when the Supreme 
Court decided Katz v. United States.14 In Katz, the Court departed from the 
traditional Fourth Amendment trespass analysis,15 stating: “[T]he Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places.”16 This is known as the “Katz Test.”17 
                                                                                                                     
 11 Snapchat is an application that allows the user to send self-destructing photos to 
other users. See Elyse Betters, What’s the Point of Snapchat and How Does It Work?, 
POCKET-LINT (Dec. 26, 2015), http://www.pocket-lint.com/news/131313-what-s-the-point-
of-snapchat-and-how-does-it-work [https://perma.cc/W5LW-RFVM]. 
 12 Tinder is an online dating application that opens a line of communication between 
two individuals based on mutual attraction. See Antonio Borrello, The Shocking Truth 
About Tinder; It’s More than Just a Hook-up App!, HUFFINGTON POST, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/antonio-borrello-phd/the-shocking-truth-about-_7_b_8011 
462.html [https://perma.cc/F56D-D5HU] (last updated Aug. 20, 2016). 
 13 Venmo is a financial application that enables individuals to electronically transfer 
funds. How It Works, VENMO, https://venmo.com/about/product/ [https://perma.cc/TNQ7-
SE28]. 
 14 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, law enforcement placed a 
listening device on the outside of a telephone booth where Katz was making a call to 
discuss illegal wagering. Id. at 348. Under the traditional trespass doctrine, this would not 
be a Fourth Amendment violation because there was no trespass on Katz’s property rights. 
See id. at 352–53.  
 15 Until 1967, the Fourth Amendment only protected against government agents 
physically trespassing upon a suspect’s property rights. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 
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The Katz Test asks if the government action violates an individual’s 
“reasonable expectation of privacy.”18 The test is a two-part framework.19 
First, the defendant must have a subjective expectation of privacy in the area 
or item searched.20 Second, society must deem it an objectively reasonable 
expectation of privacy.21 The first prong is easily met,22 while the second 
prong is difficult to define.23 The Court has explained that the second prong 
examines “our societal understanding” of what deserves “protection from 
government invasion.”24 Although the societal understanding of privacy 
constantly evolves, the Court has established some general rules. 
First, anything exposed to the public possesses no reasonable expectation 
of privacy.25 Second, information that is knowingly given to a third-party has 
no reasonable expectation of privacy.26 Third, anything in a constitutionally 
                                                                                                                     
U.S. 438, 463–64 (1928), overruled by Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, and Berger v. New York, 
388 U.S. 41, 50–51 (1967). It should be noted, however, that the Court has not completely 
discarded the trespass doctrine. It appears that the Katz Test supplements the trespass 
doctrine instead of replacing it. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950–51 (2012). 
 16 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.  
 17 Cases as recent as April of 2016 have used this term. See United States v. 
Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 890 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 18 This phrase was coined in Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 
(Harlan, J., concurring), and is the benchmark test for determining if a government action 
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. RIC SIMMONS & RENÉE MCDONALD 
HUTCHINS, LEARNING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 56 (2015).  
 19 SIMMONS & HUTCHINS, supra note 18, at 57.  
 20 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
 21 Id.  
 22 Monu Bedi, Social Networks, Government Surveillance, and the Fourth 
Amendment Mosaic Theory, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1809, 1823 (2014) (citing Debra Katz, Case 
Comment, Constitutional Law—Fourth Amendment Protection for Homeless Person’s 
Closed Containers in an Outdoor “Home,” 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 279, 281 & n.15 
(1992)).  
 23 Id. (citing several articles devoted to examining the question of what constitutes an 
objective reasonable expectation of privacy). Ironically, the Katz Test—while 
groundbreaking—actually produced more confusion regarding what constituted a “search” 
under the Fourth Amendment. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 580 (5th ed. 2012).  
 24 LAFAVE, supra note 23, at 588 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 
(1984)).  
 25 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351; see also Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924). 
Although Hester was decided before Katz, the principle in that case remains good law: 
when an individual engages in activity in open view, there is no Fourth Amendment 
protection. For example, the Fourth Amendment does not protect anything seen from a 
government-operated plane because it is in public view. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 
207, 213–14 (1986).  
 26 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971) (holding that an individual does 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily revealed to a third-
party because it is reasonable to assume that the third-party will convey that information to 
law enforcement); see also infra Part II.C.  
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protected area discovered by law enforcement, solely because of special 
technology, maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy.27 
B. Adapting to Change: How the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
Adjusts to Technology 
One question has troubled courts since the implementation of the Katz 
Test: How does the reasonable expectation of privacy change with new 
developments in technology? The second prong of the Katz analysis requires 
societal recognition of the expectation of privacy. However, society’s 
expectations of privacy change when society itself changes. Thus, new 
technology affects the implementation of the Fourth Amendment in two major 
ways: first, new technology used by law enforcement; and second, new 
technology used by individuals28 (such as computers, email, and cell-site 
data).  
It has been easier for the Court to apply the Fourth Amendment to new 
technologies used by law enforcement.29 The Court developed a flexible, 
enduring, and broad framework to analyze new technology used by law 
enforcement.30 However, the Court has struggled to create such a test for new 
technology used by the public.31  
An adequate test for technology is elusive because of the difficulty 
determining when a technology becomes so widely used, and used in such a 
way, that society recognizes a reasonable expectation of privacy in that 
technology. Due to this difficulty, the Supreme Court—despite several 
opportunities to do so—has not issued a broad, generally applicable test to 
determine when the Fourth Amendment protects new technology.32 Without 
                                                                                                                     
 27 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).  
 28 Ric Simmons, The Missed Opportunities of Riley v. California, 12 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 253, 257 (2014). 
 29 Id. Kyllo v. United States is the seminal case regarding law enforcement’s use of 
new technology. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33. In Kyllo, police officers used thermal imaging 
technology to sense heat from lamps used to grow marijuana in the defendant’s house. Id. 
at 29. This was a search because the technology was not in general public use, and it 
revealed information (heat emanating from lamps) that could not be collected without 
entering into a constitutionally protected area. Id. at 40. The Court followed a similar 
rationale in Ciraolo in finding that the mere fact that the defendant erected a fence around 
his yard to shield his activities did not preclude an officer from observing his yard from a 
public vantage point; thus, the defendant’s expectation that his yard was protected from 
observation was unreasonable. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213–14.  
 30 See SIMMONS & HUTCHINS, supra note 18, at 91. 
 31 Simmons, supra note 28, at 257. 
 32 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014) (limiting the holding to cell 
phones and declining to extend a general rule to electronic storage); United States v. Jones, 
132 S. Ct. 945, 949–50 (2012) (relying on the traditional trespass doctrine to decide the 
case, thereby passing on the opportunity to create a broad rule for new technologies); City 
of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 758–60 (2010) (declining to decide if a reasonable 
expectation of privacy exists in electronic pagers). See generally Simmons, supra note 28 
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guidance from the Supreme Court, lower courts have struggled to apply the 
Fourth Amendment in the digital age.  
This leaves scholars to contemplate how courts should apply the Fourth 
Amendment to future digital issues that will surely arise. One approach is to 
adopt the mosaic theory.  
The mosaic theory’s primary purpose is to protect large amounts of 
electronic and digital information. Under the mosaic theory, if law 
enforcement aggregates enough information that is otherwise unprotected, 
they can violate an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.33 The D.C. 
Circuit introduced this approach in United States v. Maynard.34 
In Maynard, the court held that the aggregation of Global Position System 
(GPS) surveillance over a twenty-eight-day period constituted a violation of 
the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy.35 On appeal, the Supreme 
Court decided the case using the traditional trespass doctrine36—ducking the 
opportunity to issue a broad rule for new technology.37 Although the Court 
declined to issue binding precedent on the mosaic theory, five Justices showed 
support for the theory in concurring opinions.38 
Because the Supreme Court avoided ruling on the mosaic theory, it left the 
lower courts without guidance. As a result, a circuit split developed on the 
issue.39 The split was eventually resolved after an en banc hearing in the 
Fourth Circuit.40  
The Fourth Circuit originally endorsed the mosaic theory; the court ruled 
that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy over their cell-site 
                                                                                                                     
(arguing that the Supreme Court has been too cautious in Fourth Amendment cases 
implicating new technology).  
 33 Benjamin M. Ostrander, Note, The “Mosaic Theory” and Fourth Amendment Law, 
86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1733, 1734–35 (2011) (“The ‘mosaic theory’ . . . holds that 
individual law enforcement actions that are not searches become a search when aggregated, 
as the whole reveals more than the individual acts it comprises.”). 
 34 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 561–63 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part sub 
nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 35 Id. at 558, 563 (“Society recognizes Jones’s expectation of privacy in his 
movements over the course of a month as reasonable, and the use of the GPS device to 
monitor those movements defeated that reasonable expectation.”). Notice that the 
movement was over public roads, and thus the activity was visible to the public. See id. at 
559. Under traditional Fourth Amendment analysis, this would not be a violation of the 
defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy, but the court used the mosaic theory and 
found that “prolonged GPS monitoring reveals an intimate picture of the subject’s life that 
he expects no one to have.” Id. at 563. 
 36 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953–54, aff’g in part Maynard, 615 F.3d 544. 
 37 See Simmons, supra note 28, at 259.  
 38 Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 
312 (2012).  
 39 See infra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
 40 See United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 425 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc).  
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location information (CSLI)41: “[T]he government invades a reasonable 
expectation of privacy when it relies upon technology not in general use to 
discover the movements of an individual over an extended period of time.”42 
While the Court never used the word “mosaic,” the panel opinion clearly 
endorsed the mosaic theory.43 However, because of the lack of guidance and 
confusion on this issue, the Fourth Circuit reversed in an en banc hearing and 
decided against adopting the mosaic theory, thereby joining other circuits in 
their treatment of CSLI.44 This illustrates the uncertain status of the mosaic 
theory.  
Other circuits have also refused to adopt the mosaic theory. The Sixth, 
Eleventh, and Fifth Circuits determined that an individual has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy over his or her CSLI.45 These courts (including the en 
banc Fourth Circuit) found that individuals voluntarily convey CSLI to a third-
party when they use cell phones and thus have no reasonable expectation of 
privacy over that information.46 This reasoning stems from a cornerstone of 
Fourth Amendment law: the third-party doctrine.  
                                                                                                                     
 41 As a cell phone receives a cell signal, it communicates with cell towers nearby; this 
geographic information is stored by the phone company and reveals the location of the 
phone. See Robinson Meyer, Do Police Need a Warrant to See Where a Phone Is?, 
ATLANTIC (Aug. 8, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/08/warrant 
less-cell-phone-location-tracking/400775/ [https://perma.cc/DK24-UB3T]. This is not trivial; 
in 2014, AT&T received nearly 65,000 requests for CSLI. Id.  
 42 United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 349 (4th Cir. 2015), adhered to in part on 
reh’g en banc, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 43 This is evident from the emphasis on information recovered “over an extended 
period of time.” Id. Further, the court relied on the concurrences in United States v. Jones, 
which discussed the mosaic theory at length. See id.; see also Orin Kerr, Fourth Circuit 
Adopts Mosaic Theory, Holds that Obtaining “Extended” Cell-Site Records Requires a 
Warrant, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/08/05/fourth-circuit-adopts-mosaic-theory-holds-that-
obtaining-extended-cell-site-records-requires-a-warrant/ [https://perma.cc/D72L-T9JM]. 
 44 Graham, 824 F.3d at 428.  
 45 See United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 888 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. 
Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 511 (11th Cir. 2015); In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 
F.3d 600, 613–14 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 46 Graham, 824 F.3d at 427–28; Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 888; Davis, 785 F.3d at 511; 
Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 613–14. Interestingly, the Fourth Circuit originally 
rejected this argument, relying on the idea that possession of a cell phone is not a 
completely voluntarily act in this era: “Cell phone and text message communications are so 
pervasive that some persons may consider them to be essential means or necessary 
instruments for self-expression, even self-identification.” Graham, 796 F.3d at 356 
(quoting City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010)). “Modern cell phones . . . are 
now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars 
might conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy.” Id. (alteration in 
original) (quoting Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014)). Further, the Third 
Circuit has stated that “[a] cell phone customer has not ‘voluntarily’ shared his location 
information with a cellular provider in any meaningful way.” In re U.S. for an Order 
Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 
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C. How the Third-Party Doctrine Operates within the Fourth 
Amendment Framework 
As a general principle, an individual possesses no reasonable expectation 
of privacy over information voluntarily conveyed to a third-party.47 While the 
Court established the third-party doctrine prior to Katz, the Court has since 
reaffirmed the principle in the post-Katz era. 
One such occasion was United States v. Miller, which established that the 
third-party doctrine applies not only to information conferred to individuals, 
but also to information revealed to companies.48 The Court reaffirmed this 
principle four years later in Smith v. Maryland.49 
In Smith, the Court held that the defendant had no reasonable expectation 
of privacy over phone numbers dialed from his phone.50 The Court supported 
this conclusion based on two rationales. First, the defendant had no subjective 
expectation of privacy because he knew the telephone company was receiving 
his dialing information.51 Second, he voluntarily conveyed the information to 
the company in order to place a phone call, and thus assumed the risk that the 
company would relay the phone numbers he dialed to the police.52 
An important aspect of Smith was the distinction between “address” 
information and “content” information. The Court classified the dialed 
telephone numbers as address information that had no reasonable expectation 
of privacy because the defendant voluntarily revealed the numbers to the 
company to place the call.53 Smith contrasts this address information with the 
telephone conversation in Katz, which is protected content information 
                                                                                                                     
304, 317 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Zanders v. State, 58 N.E.3d 254, at 263 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2016).  
 47 SIMMONS & HUTCHINS, supra note 18, at 118. The third-party doctrine is often 
traced back to Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (“Neither this Court nor 
any member of it has ever expressed the view that the Fourth Amendment protects a 
wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his 
wrongdoing will not reveal it.”). 
 48 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 351 (1967)) (holding that when an individual gave financial information to a 
bank he “knowingly expose[d]” that information to the public, and thus had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy over the information).  
 49 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979).  
 50 Id. at 745. 
 51 Id. at 735.  
 52 Id. at 744. This rationale in Smith is particularly important because the Court was 
applying the third-party doctrine to a technological advancement. See Monu Bedi, 
Facebook and Interpersonal Privacy: Why the Third Party Doctrine Should Not Apply, 54 
B.C. L. REV. 1, 12–14 (2013).  
 53 Smith, 442 U.S. at 742 (“[W]e doubt that people in general entertain any actual 
expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial. All telephone users realize that they must 
‘convey’ phone numbers to the telephone company, since it is through telephone company 
switching equipment that their calls are completed.”). 
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expected to remain private.54 In other words, society understood that the 
telephone company must record dialed phone numbers to place calls, but there 
was no expectation that the telephone company could hear the content of those 
calls.55  
The application of the third-party doctrine has encountered problems in the 
digital age.56 These problems arise because the distinction between address 
and content information has disappeared.57 In digital communications, third 
parties must have access to both address and content information to send 
messages.58 When a text message or email is sent, the sender knows that the 
third-party intermediary has access to the content of that message.59 How 
could a phone company send a text, or an Internet Service Provider (ISP) send 
an email, if they could not access the contents of the message?60 Third parties 
                                                                                                                     
 54 Id. at 741 (“[A] pen register differs significantly from the listening device 
employed in Katz, for pen registers do not acquire the contents of communications.”). 
 55 Another example can be illustrated in the form of standard mail. A sender of mail 
understands that a third-party (the postal workers) must see the address of the letter. 
However, there is no expectation that the postal workers will open the envelope and read 
the contents of the letter. Thus, the content information of a letter is protected, but the 
address of the letter is not protected.  
 56 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(“This approach [to the third-party doctrine] is ill suited to the digital age.”); see also Bedi, 
supra note 52, at 15 (“The Third Party Doctrine has proven difficult to apply in the Internet 
context.”). 
 57 SIMMONS & HUTCHINS, supra note 18, at 128 (“[I]n the context of electronic 
communication, one of the distinctions between address information and content 
information disappears. Third party companies (such as internet service providers) record 
and store content information the same way that they record or store address 
information.”). 
 58 This is unlike past communications. For example, in Smith, while the phone 
company needed the address information (telephone numbers) to complete the call, they 
did not need access to the content of the call itself. Smith, 442 U.S. at 737. Similarly, for 
traditional mail, the government must have access to the address to deliver mail. There is 
no need for the government to know the contents of the letter to complete the delivery.  
 59 The Sixth, Eleventh, Fifth, and Fourth Circuits relied on the voluntary consent 
rationale to determine that the Fourth Amendment does not protect a defendant’s CSLI. See 
supra Part II.B. 
 60 Apple is known for encrypting their “iMessages,” which provides users with a 
sense of security. However, Apple encrypts the messages; this means Apple also has the 
ability to break the encryption if desired. See Greg Kumparak, Apple Explains Exactly How 
Secure iMessage Really Is, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 27, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/02/ 
27/apple-explains-exactly-how-secure-imessage-really-is/ [https://perma.cc/2ML5-LVAS] 
(“[B]ecause Apple is encrypting messages/data once for each device and has control over 
the key infrastructure, they may . . . be able to throw another public key into the mix—
thereby allowing messages sent to you after that point to be read by whoever has the 
corresponding private key.”). Thus, the message may be encrypted, but if Apple so desires, 
they can read the message. Interestingly, several phone applications have been able to 
remedy this problem by using encryption technology. The sender’s text message is 
encrypted until it reaches its destination, and thus the phone company cannot view the 
content of the text. See Chris Stobing, How and Why to Encrypt Your Text Messages, 
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can access this content information just like the phone company in Smith had 
access to address information (telephone numbers) required to place the call.61  
Under traditional third-party doctrine rationale, this content information is 
unprotected because senders knowingly share it with a third-party.62 However, 
some courts place a heavier emphasis on the address/content distinction and 
protect any content information in these communications.63 These two 
conflicting approaches have resulted in a circuit split.  
III. THE CURRENT COMPETING FRAMEWORKS FOR DIGITAL 
COMMUNICATIONS AND THE INHERENT FLAWS IN EACH 
There are two approaches to applying the third-party doctrine to digital 
communications. Some circuits use a strict third-party doctrine analysis, while 
some circuits focus more on the address/content distinction.64 Courts are 
currently trying to determine which approach to follow, and have little 
guidance on the issue.65 Both approaches have flaws, and this presents the 
opportunity for the Court to solve the dispute using the mosaic theory.  
A. Traditional Third-Party Doctrine Applies—No Protection for Digital 
Communications 
The first solution to this problem strictly applies the third-party doctrine. 
This argument relies on the sender voluntarily exposing the message to the 
intermediary.  
1. Rationale Behind the Strict Use of the Third-Party Doctrine 
The third-party doctrine requires the sender to voluntarily reveal 
information to a third-party. Emails, text messages, and other digital 
                                                                                                                     
HOW-TO GEEK (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.howtogeek.com/226535/how-and-why-to-
encrypt-your-text-messages [https://perma.cc/P6VN-D8CH]. However, the place of 
encrypted information in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is also unsettled. See generally 
Lee Tien, Doors, Envelopes, and Encryption: The Uncertain Role of Precautions in Fourth 
Amendment Law, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 873 (2005) (examining the extent to which one has 
the right to protect their own privacy).  
 61 See, e.g., Helena Horton, Snapchat Just Reserved the Rights to Store and Use All 
Selfies Taken with the Device, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/tech 
nology/news/11966036/Snapchat-just-reserved-the-rights-to-store-and-use-all-selfies-taken-
with-the-device.html [https://perma.cc/U8RE-FQZN].  
 62 See infra Part III.A.  
 63 See infra Part III.B. 
 64 SIMMONS & HUTCHINS, supra note 18, at 131.  
 65 In 2015, for example, a court stated: “Indeed, it is unclear whether even the 
contents of emails stored on an Internet Service Provider’s (ISP) servers are entitled to 
Fourth Amendment protection.” United States v. Ortega, No. CR415-134, 2015 
WL6566011, at *1 n.2 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 30, 2015). 
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communications travel through a third-party to reach the intended recipient. 
Because the sender knows the third-party can see, copy, and store the 
messages, they lose any expectation of privacy in these communications.66  
Under this view, electronic communications are no different than the 
phone numbers dialed in Smith. The phone numbers lacked Fourth 
Amendment protection because the defendant knew he had to reveal phone 
numbers to complete the call.67 Similarly, the sender of an email understands 
they must share the content of their message with the ISP for the message to 
reach the recipient. Therefore, email messages lose any expectation of privacy 
in the communication.68  
Some argue that because the Fourth Amendment protects letters sent 
through standard mail,69 and an email is just an electronic form of standard 
mail, the Fourth Amendment should also protect the content of email. 
However, these situations are different.70 In standard mail, the sender expects 
the contents of the letter to remain enclosed in the envelope. In contrast, the 
sender of email knows that the intermediary will have access to the content of 
the message.71 This difference is why the email/standard mail analogy is 
flawed.72  
                                                                                                                     
 66 Individuals should know they have no privacy in emails because news 
organizations have recently reported that messages sent through a third-party are not 
protected information. See Steven Musil, Google Filing Says Gmail Users Have No 
Expectation of Privacy, CNET (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.cnet.com/news/google-filing-
says-gmail-users-have-no-expectation-of-privacy [https://perma.cc/F3M5-D9JQ]. 
 67 See supra Part II.C. 
 68 Rehberg v. Paulk, 598 F.3d 1268, 1281 (11th Cir.) (“A person . . . loses a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in emails, at least after the email is sent to and received 
by a third party.”), vacated on other grounds, 611 F.3d 828 (11th Cir. 2010); In re Search 
Warrant for Contents of Elec. Mail, 665 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1224 (D. Or. 2009) 
(“[S]ubscribers are, or should be, aware that their personal information and the contents of 
their online communications are accessible to the ISP and its employees and can be shared 
with the government under the appropriate circumstances.”). Additionally, courts have 
used the third-party doctrine to determine that individuals have no privacy over the Internet 
Protocol (I.P.) addresses they use because when an individual uses their computer to 
connect to their email, they must knowingly share their I.P. address with third parties. 
United States v. Caira, No. 14-1003, 2016 WL 4376472, at *3 (7th Cir. Aug. 17, 2016). 
Once an I.P. address is known, the government can then contact the owner of the I.P. 
address (usually the internet provider) to discover much more information about the end 
user of the I.P. address such as account information and physical address information. See 
id. at *1–2.  
 69 E.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984). 
 70 “Some people seem to think that [emails] are as private as letters, phone calls, or 
journal entries. The blunt fact is, they are not.” Search Warrant, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1224. 
 71 In 2013, Google argued this point convincingly: “As numerous courts have held, 
the automated processing of email is so widely understood and accepted that the act of 
sending an email constitutes implied consent to automated processing as a matter of law.” 
See Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 19, In re Google Inc. Gmail Litigation, No. 5:13-
MD-02430-LHK, 2013 WL 5423918 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013). The brief cites several 
opinions from state courts asserting that individuals should know that messages sent 
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2. Problems with Strictly Applying the Third-Party Doctrine  
Strictly applying the third-party doctrine has a major problem: the more 
technology progresses, the more individuals share with third parties. In the 
information age, individuals live much of their lives online. Every text, post 
shared on Facebook, or document uploaded to the cloud is shared with a third-
party. This trend shows no sign of slowing down as technology advances. 
Individuals now wear watches that interact with the Internet,73 drive cars that 
relay information through GPS to third parties, and keep daily schedules 
through companies like Google.  
Because of this increased sharing, a strict application of the third-party 
doctrine will diminish the Fourth Amendment’s value. Unlike the 1970s, when 
Smith was decided, technology now requires sharing information with third 
parties on a daily basis.74 The strict application of the third-party doctrine has 
strong legal support, but legal realism may require a different approach.75 In 
reality, the promises of the Fourth Amendment will decay if courts do not 
update it for the information age.  
B. Distinguishing Address and Content Information—Examining the 
Solution Proposed by Quon and Warshak 
Some courts have adopted a solution reliant upon the address/content 
distinction. This solution assigns privacy protection based upon what type of 
information is transmitted.  
                                                                                                                     
through the Internet are subject to transmission and recording, and thus voluntarily consent 
to this risk. Id. at 19–20.  
 72 A better analogy can be drawn to a postcard. Email, like a postcard, reveals both 
the address information and the content information to the third-party intermediary. See 
NANCY FLYNN & RANDOPLH KAHN, E-MAIL RULES 173 (2003) (“The common analogy is 
that standard e-mail is like sending a ‘postcard written in pencil through the postal mail.’ A 
postcard, because anyone who sees the message along the way can freely read it . . . .”); 
Micalyn S. Harris, E-mail Privacy: An Oxymoron?, 78 NEB. L. REV. 386, 387 (1999) (“E-
mail has been likened to . . . [the] use of postcards through the United States Postal 
Service.”). 
 73 The Apple Watch is one example. See About Bluetooth and Wi-Fi on Apple Watch, 
APPLE, https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204562 [https://perma.cc/BT3G-C4ED]. 
 74 Some even argue that because of the necessity to use new technology, individuals 
are not truly consenting to sharing information with third parties. See supra note 46.  
 75 See SIMMONS & HUTCHINS, supra note 18, at 131 (citing United States v. Warshak, 
631 F.3d 266, 284 (6th Cir. 2010)) (commenting that Warshak was a victory for legal 
realism over legal formalism).  
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1. Rationale Behind the Address/Content Distinction  
In United States v. Forrester, a case with similar facts to Smith, the Ninth 
Circuit addressed the privacy of digital communications.76 However, the court 
in Forrester decided that Smith should be interpreted narrowly for digital 
communications.77 The court distinguished information voluntarily given to a 
third-party to direct the message (address information), from information 
given to a third-party that is the actual message itself (content information).78  
The court believed that content information is more worthy of protection 
than address information: “[T]he Court in Smith and Katz drew a clear line 
between unprotected addressing information and protected content 
information . . . .”79 The Ninth Circuit affirmed this principle in Quon v. Arch 
Wireless Operating Co.: “[I]t is not reasonable to expect privacy in the 
information used to ‘address’ a text message, such as the dialing of a phone 
number to send a message. However, users do have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the content of their text messages vis-a-vis the service 
provider.”80 
In 2010, the address/content theory appeared again in United States v. 
Warshak.81 In Warshak, the government subpoenaed the defendant’s ISP to 
obtain the defendant’s emails.82 The court determined this violated the 
defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy because the emails were similar 
to the content of the phone conversation in Katz.83 Particularly, the court 
focused on the intimate information that is shared via email.84 Similar to Quon 
and Forrester, the court relied on the comparison of email to standard mail and 
the content of a telephone call.85 
                                                                                                                     
 76 United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 77 See id. at 509–11. 
 78 Id.  
 79 Id. at 510. The court argued that electronic address information does not reveal 
anything more than a phone number does. Id. With address information, the government 
can only make “educated guesses” about what the information is being used for, whereas 
content information is more like the phone call in Katz, and should be protected because it 
reveals exact details about the communication. Id. Further, the court relied heavily on the 
analogy of email to standard mail. Id. This analogy is weak. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 80 Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 905 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding 
that text messages sent via an electronic pager are protected information under the Fourth 
Amendment), rev’d on other grounds, City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010).  
 81 United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 285–86 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 82 Id. at 283. This was significant. Over several months, the government subpoenaed 
about 27,000 emails. Id.  
 83 Id. at 286.  
 84 Id. at 284 (referencing the following exchanged via email: “[l]overs exchang[ing] 
sweet nothings,” individuals making online purchases, sharing business plans, and 
communicating doctor-patient appointment information). 
 85 Id. at 285–86 (“Given the fundamental similarities between email and traditional 
forms of communication, it would defy common sense to afford emails lesser Fourth 
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2. Problems with Applying the Address/Content Distinction  
There are three problems with the Quon and Warshak framework. First, it 
disregards the third-party doctrine and is problematic if applied to other third-
party scenarios. Second, distinguishing between address and content 
information is difficult, and this difficulty will persist as technology advances. 
Third, the Supreme Court is not eager to adopt this framework.  
First, Quon and Warshak conflict with the third-party doctrine.86 Consent, 
not type of information, is the basis of the third-party doctrine.87 Both Quon 
and Warshak focus on the sensitive information in emails;88 this logic departs 
from Smith. The phone numbers in Smith lacked protection because the 
defendant voluntarily provided them to a third-party; the fact that phone 
numbers are not sensitive information was not why the Court found they 
lacked protection.89 Further, the Court protected the phone conversation in 
Katz because there was no expectation anyone was recording the call—the 
sensitive content of the call was not a factor.90 
Similarly, in standard mail, the Fourth Amendment does not protect 
address information because the sender knows the intermediary will see the 
address. On the other hand, the Fourth Amendment protects the contents of the 
letter inside the envelope because there is no expectation the intermediary will 
                                                                                                                     
Amendment protection.”). As discussed earlier, the analogy of email to standard mail is 
flawed. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 86 In Quon, the court shockingly stated that it was “irrelevant” that a third-party had 
access to the information being transferred. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 
F.3d 892, 905 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 87 In Hoffa, the Court did not ask if the information was sensitive or deserving of 
protection, rather, the Court asked if the defendant voluntarily offered that information to a 
third-party. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966). More recently, an Indiana 
state court illustrated this point stating: 
Miller, Smith, and its progeny do not categorically exclude third-party 
records from Fourth Amendment protection. . . . It is the act of 
voluntary conveyance—not the mere fact that the information winds up 
in the third party’s records—that demonstrates an assumption of risk of 
disclosure and therefore the lack of any reasonable expectation of 
privacy. 
Zanders v. State, 58 N.E.3d 254, 263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). 
 88 See supra Part III.B.1.  
 89 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979). In finding that a reasonable 
expectation of privacy did not exist, the Court stated: “[P]etitioner voluntarily conveyed 
numerical information to the telephone company and ‘exposed’ that information to its 
equipment in the ordinary course of business. In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that 
the company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.” Id. 
 90 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“The 
critical fact in this case is that ‘[o]ne who occupies it, [a telephone booth] shuts the door 
behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume’ 
that his conversation is not being intercepted.” (alterations in original) (quoting id. at 352 
(majority opinion))).  
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open the envelope and read the letter. The possibility that letters may contain 
sensitive information is not the thrust of the Fourth Amendment analysis.  
For these reasons, email is more comparable to a postcard because the 
sender knows the intermediary will see the address and content of the 
message.91 Thus, Quon and Warshak focus on the wrong things: they focus on 
the type of information sent, not the consent of the sender.  
If courts apply the logic in Quon and Warshak to traditional third-party 
scenarios, problems arise. Assume Jim asks his friend, Nathan, to deliver five 
$20 bills to Gary. Clipped to the money is a hand-written note showing Gary’s 
address and a message that reads: “Here is the $100 I owe you for the 
cocaine.” In this scenario, Nathan is clearly acting as an intermediary (like an 
ISP for email). His job is to transmit the money and the note to the intended 
recipient, Gary. Nathan sees the address needed to deliver the note, and he can 
also see the content of the note itself (like an ISP can see the content of an 
email). If we focus on the type of information, like Quon and Warshak 
propose, the Fourth Amendment protects the entire note (even though it was 
voluntarily given to a third party) because it possesses content information. 
This result is hard to live with.92 
Secondly, this proposed framework faces practical difficulties. While a 
clear distinction between address and content information once existed, that 
line is now blurred.93 Is a detail-revealing website URL94 protected content 
information or unprotected address information?95 What about 
                                                                                                                     
 91 Just like extra effort is taken to protect letters sent through the mail, the sender of 
an email can encrypt the email so that it is only readable by the recipient, and not the 
intermediary. See Jesse Emspak, CNBC Explains: How to Encrypt Your Email, CNBC 
(Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.cnbc.com/2014/01/08/ns-how-to-encrypt-your-email.html 
[https://perma.cc/2HNR-UU44]. 
 92 The authors of Quon and Warshak would likely respond that the address/content 
distinction should only be applied to digital communications sent through third parties. 
However, due to the reliance of their arguments on the comparison between email and 
standard mail, that response is hard to swallow. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 
266, 285–86 (6th Cir. 2010); Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 905 (9th 
Cir. 2008). 
 93 See SIMMONS & HUTCHINS, supra note 18, at 131.  
 94 URL stands for Uniform Resource Locator or Universal Resource Locator. This is 
the “address” of every website on the Internet. See URL, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/URL [https://perma.cc/MYY2-A3ZP].  
 95 For example, if I visit “http://www.elevenwarriors.com/ohio-state-football/2015-
national-championship/2015/01/48289/instacap-ohio-state-rides-ezekiel-elliott-to-a-42-20-
win-over,” that URL is the address of my communication with the Internet. It reveals that I 
was reading about the 2014–2015 Ohio State Buckeyes winning the College Football 
National Championship. Tim Shoemaker, Instacap: Ohio State Rides Ezekiel Elliott to a 
42–20 Win over Oregon to Win the National Championship, ELEVEN WARRIORS (Jan. 13, 
2015), http://www.elevenwarriors.com/ohio-state-football/2015-national-championship/2015/ 
01/48289/instacap-ohio-state-rides-ezekiel-elliott-to-a-42-20-win-over [https://perma.cc/D6VF-
ZNFL]. Does this become content information? For a full discussion on the classification of 
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communications that have undefined recipients such as a Facebook post to 
“friends?” Under the Quon and Warshak framework, the Fourth Amendment 
may protect the Facebook post—even though the information is displayed to 
potentially hundreds of people—because it contains content information. It is 
hard to fathom that a communication to potentially hundreds of people 
possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy.  
Finally, the Supreme Court is not eager to endorse the Quon and Warshak 
proposal. In 2010, the Court had the opportunity to adopt this framework,96 
but the Court expressly refused to decide if the address/content distinction 
should control future technological problems.97 If the Court believed this was 
the best solution moving forward, it would have endorsed the theory in 2010.  
IV. APPLYING THE MOSAIC THEORY TO DIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS 
The current proposed frameworks analyzing digital communications under 
the Fourth Amendment fail to deliver desirable results. Luckily, courts have a 
better alternative: the mosaic theory. The mosaic theory does not focus on the 
consent of the sender, nor does it focus on the type of information sent. The 
mosaic theory simply helps determine when the aggregation of personal 
information violates an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Thus, 
the mosaic theory is not a major change in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence—it is a tool courts should use when determining if an 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy has been violated.  
A. A Look at the Benefits of the Mosaic Theory 
The mosaic theory has three benefits. First, it protects the large amounts of 
information for which the Supreme Court has indicated concern. Second, it 
saves the application of third-party doctrine. Third, it presents a flexible 
framework that courts can apply to future technologies. 
1. Protection of Large Amounts of Digital Information 
The mosaic theory protects large amounts of information that can reveal 
extremely personal information. The D.C. Circuit applied this rationale to GPS 
tracking in Maynard.98 The court believed that a large compilation of small 
movements revealed intimate details about an individual’s life: “Prolonged 
surveillance reveals types of information not revealed by short-term 
surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, what he does not do, and 
                                                                                                                     
URLs, see Matthew J. Tokson, The Content/Envelope Distinction in Internet Law, 50 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 2105, 2134–50 (2009). 
 96 See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010). 
 97 See Simmons, supra note 28, at 265.  
 98 See generally United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 561–63 (D.C. Cir. 2010), 
aff’d in part sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
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what he does ensemble. These types of information can each reveal more 
about a person than does any individual trip viewed in isolation.”99 The court 
distinguished this from the smaller pieces of information that compose the 
mosaic; that information reveals much less.  
The court also noted that a reasonable person does not expect his or her 
daily movements and activities to be monitored constantly by the 
government.100 This constant surveillance is a new phenomenon, and it would 
have been almost impossible prior to the digital age.101  
These same concerns exist with digital communications. Like physical 
movements, one email or text message may not reveal much about an 
individual’s life. Several months of communications, however, will surely 
reveal purchasing habits, political preferences, medical information, and 
extended conversations between friends and lovers. Further, like GPS data 
points, collecting months of communication would most likely not have been 
feasible for police prior to the digital age. However, with current technology, 
police just let their suspects conduct their daily lives, and they can gain access 
to a wealth of information via the third-party intermediary.102 
The mosaic theory solves these problems. It protects large amounts of 
information that are now routine in daily life, and it honors the reasonable 
person’s expectation that the government is not constantly monitoring every 
movement and communication. 
2. Saving the Third-Party Doctrine  
The mosaic theory preserves the traditional third-party doctrine. Unlike the 
Quon and Warshak proposal, applying the mosaic theory to digital 
communications will not affect the third-party doctrine analysis.103  
                                                                                                                     
 99 Id. at 562. 
 100 Id. at 563 (“A reasonable person does not expect anyone to monitor and retain a 
record of every time he drives his car, including his origin, route, destination, and each 
place he stops and how long he stays there; rather, he expects each of those movements to 
remain ‘disconnected and anonymous.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Nader v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 772 (N.Y. 1970) (Breitel, J., concurring))).  
 101 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring) (“Traditional surveillance for any 
extended period of time was difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken. The 
surveillance at issue in this case—constant monitoring of the location of a vehicle for four 
weeks—would have required a large team of agents, multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial 
assistance.”); see also infra note 109.  
 102 Remember that in Warshak the police had access to roughly 27,000 emails sent by 
the defendant. See supra note 82. It is doubtful that law enforcement could obtain all of 
these communications in the pre-digital era. 
 103 Interestingly, one commentator has recommended using the mosaic theory as one 
factor when determining a standard for voluntary disclosure of digital communications. See 
Margaret E. Twomey, Voluntary Disclosure of Information as a Proposed Standard for the 
Fourth Amendment’s Third-Party Doctrine, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 401, 
416 (2015).  
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Further, the mosaic theory does not create confusion on how to apply the 
third-party doctrine. The Quon and Warshak framework created new 
questions: what is content information, and what is address information? This 
address/content distinction is sloppy and troublesome for future forms of 
technology. The mosaic theory does not concern itself with this distinction. It 
only asks how much information, and how revealing is that quantity of 
information. 
The mosaic theory simply acts as a large information exception to the 
third-party doctrine. The third-party doctrine applies traditionally until a 
mosaic threshold is met. At that point, Fourth Amendment protection activates 
for the large quantity of information.  
3. A Test that Stands the Test of Time 
A major benefit to the mosaic theory is its flexibility. With the quick 
advancements in technology,104 a new Fourth Amendment framework should 
have the ability to develop with technology. Much like the reasonable 
expectation of privacy, the mosaic theory does not propose a bright-line test 
that is specific and limited to a certain technology.105  
The mosaic theory simply asserts that, when law enforcement aggregates 
enough information to reveal an intimate portrait of an individual’s life, that 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is violated. Thus, as technology 
develops, and new methods of communication are created, the question will 
remain the same: is the government aggregating so much information that an 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is violated?  
B. The Feasibility of Applying the Mosaic Theory to Digital 
Communications 
The mosaic theory is a viable solution to provide Fourth Amendment 
protection to digital communications. First, a new framework is needed 
because the current proposed solutions are not desirable and the Supreme 
Court is unlikely to adopt these solutions. Second, the mosaic theory aligns 
with the Court’s recent concern for large quantities of information. 
                                                                                                                     
104 United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 890 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[S]ometimes new 
technologies—say, the latest iterations of smartphones or social media—evolve at rates 
more common to superbugs than to large mammals.”).  
 105 Some see this as the downfall of the Riley decision. See Simmons, supra note 28, at 
264 (arguing the Court missed the opportunity to issue a broad ruling for the future of the 
Fourth Amendment, and instead decided to issue a narrow decision that only applies to cell 
phone searches pursuant to the search incident to lawful arrest doctrine). The purposeful 
ambiguity and nature of the broad rule allowed the Katz Test to be flexible enough to adapt 
to new situations over the past fifty years.  
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1. Rejection of the Quon and Warshak Framework and the Failure of 
the Third-Party Doctrine to Protect Sensitive Information 
First, applying the mosaic theory to digital communications is feasible 
because the Court has not endorsed either of the current solutions. The Court 
had the opportunity to endorse the Quon and Warshak framework in 2010 and 
passed on the opportunity.106 This indicates the Court’s reluctance to rely on 
the address/content distinction like the circuit courts have.  
However, the alternative to the Quon and Warshak framework will not 
please the Court either. In Jones and Riley, the Court showed sensitivity for 
large amounts of digital data.107 The strict application of the third-party 
doctrine does not protect large amounts of digital communications. Thus, the 
Court is unlikely to strictly apply the third-party doctrine.  
This leaves the mosaic theory as a perfect middle ground for the Supreme 
Court. The mosaic theory enables the Court to protect large amounts of 
information transferred through a digital intermediary, while simultaneously 
respecting the third-party doctrine.  
2. Taking the Court’s Guidance from Jones and Riley  
The Court has indicated that, in the digital era, the amount of information 
obtained by law enforcement is crucial to the Fourth Amendment analysis. 
Both Jones and Riley exemplify the Court’s concern for the quantity of 
information accessible to law enforcement via technology. 
In Jones, a concern for large amounts of information was evident. 
Particularly, Justice Sotomayor, in a concurring opinion, doubted that 
individuals expect the government to track their movements over a long period 
of time: “I would ask whether people reasonably expect that their movements 
will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to 
ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual 
habits, and so on.”108 Four more justices doubted that society expected long 
term monitoring of their movements.109 The Court’s emphasis on large 
amounts of data is clear because it upheld the GPS tracking in United States v. 
                                                                                                                     
 106 See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text.  
 107 See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 108 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
 109 Justice Alito, in a concurring opinion joined by Justices Ginsberg, Breyer, and 
Kagan, stated: 
[L]onger term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses 
impinges on expectations of privacy. For such offenses, society’s 
expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others would 
not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and 
catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long 
period.  
Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).  
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Knotts,110 but four Justices concurred that law enforcement violates an 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy when tracked over a long period 
of time. 
In Riley, the Supreme Court held that law enforcement could not search a 
cell phone pursuant to the search incident to lawful arrest doctrine.111 The 
Court partially relied on the immense storage capacity of cell phones,112 and 
the reality that large amounts of information can reveal intimate details.113 The 
Court pointed to the amount of information cell phones hold, stating: “One of 
the most notable distinguishing features of modern cell phones is their 
immense storage capacity. Before cell phones, a search of a person was limited 
by physical realities and tended as a general matter to constitute only a narrow 
intrusion on privacy.”114 The Court’s decision also showed mosaic reasoning: 
“The sum of an individual’s private life can be reconstructed through a 
thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions . . . .”115 
These decisions illustrate the Court’s recent and growing concern for large 
amounts of data in the information age. The mosaic theory addresses this 
concern by protecting large amounts of data. 
C. Addressing Counterarguments to the Mosaic Theory 
Three concerns accompany the mosaic theory. The first concern is 
conceptual—the legal ground on which it stands. The second concern is 
practical—how can courts actually implement the theory? The third concern is 
speculative—what are the potential implications of the mosaic theory applied 
to traditional communications?  
1. Conceptual Concerns 
How can one piece of information not possess a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, but many of those same pieces of information do contain a reasonable 
expectation of privacy? This is a conceptual concern of the mosaic theory, and 
                                                                                                                     
 110 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (holding that GPS tracking 
occurring over the course of one day did not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
 111 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484–85 (2014). 
 112 “[T]he Court’s rationale was that smartphones typically store vast amounts of 
information about their users . . . .” United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 889 (6th Cir. 
2016) (explaining that, while Riley relied on the collection of large amounts of data, the 
defendant’s claim that the collection of his CSLI violated his Fourth Amendment rights 
fails because CSLI does not contain a similar amount of data).  
 113 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494–95 (“Modern cell phones are not just another 
technological convenience. With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for 
many Americans ‘the privacies of life.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 
116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886))). The Court also showed concern for the intimate types of 
information that cell phones can contain. Id. at 2490. 
 114 Id. at 2489.  
 115 Id. 
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a dissent by a D.C. Circuit judge echoed this criticism: “The sum of an infinite 
number of zero-value parts is also zero.”116 Put differently: why is searching 
one piece of information tolerable, but collecting many pieces of the same 
information improper?117 
The answer to this conceptual concern lies at the heart of the Katz Test. 
The mosaic theory does not reform the Katz Test, but rather, it attempts to help 
determine when an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is violated. 
It is the extended observation that violates the reasonable expectation of 
privacy, not the content itself.  
A prime example involves an individual’s medical care.118 Suppose Greg 
drives to his physician for a regular check-up. The doctor finds an abnormality 
during a routine prostate exam, and suggests Greg follow up with a prostate 
specialist. Greg then visits the prostate specialist who suggests he see an 
oncologist. Greg then sees the oncologist, who recommends Greg undergo 
surgery to remove a cancerous growth. Greg has the surgery a week later.  
Greg traveled over public roads the entire time, and because he exposed 
his movements to the public, he has no reasonable expectation of privacy over 
his individual trips to his physician, the specialist, the oncologist, and the 
surgery center.119 Each of these trips, by themselves, only reveals a small 
amount of information, such as: a doctor’s appointment, a prostate issue, 
something cancer related, and a trip to a surgery center. Individually, these 
pieces of information do not show Greg’s medical status. However, when this 
information is aggregated, a clear picture—a mosaic—of Greg’s health 
materializes. 
This example shows how an individual can lack an expectation of privacy 
over one piece of information, but can gain an expectation of privacy when the 
information is aggregated. Greg can reasonably expect that no one will track 
him long enough to diagnose his exact medical status.120  
2. Practical Concerns 
A practical concern facing the mosaic theory (in both GPS data and digital 
communications) is the establishment of the mosaic threshold: at what point 
does the aggregation of information violate an individual’s Fourth Amendment 
rights?121  
                                                                                                                     
 116 United States v. Jones 625 F.3d 766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, J., dissenting 
from the denial of rehearing en banc).  
 117 Bedi, supra note 22, at 1839–40.  
 118 This example is loosely based on an example from Maynard examining trips to a 
gynecologist and to a baby store. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 561–63 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010), aff’d in part sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 119 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 120 See supra Part IV.B.2. 
 121 The four Justice concurrence in Jones found that twenty-eight days of GPS 
surveillance was too much. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). In 
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Many scholars have addressed this question.122 This Note does not attempt 
to determine where the cutoff for a mosaic lies. The courts will decide this, 
and they should embrace the challenge, as it will contribute to the mosaic 
theory’s success.  
A mosaic threshold operates as a broad standard, not a specific rule. 
Courts impose broad legal standards frequently: tort law has the reasonable 
person,123 contract law has the duty of good faith,124 criminal procedure has 
“meaningful interference” for seizures of property,125 and courts use the 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” for Fourth Amendment searches.126 
None of these operate as a brightly defined rule. Courts have decided 
when these standards are met, and then the application of the standard shapes 
around those decisions. Courts will do the same for a mosaic standard. The 
courts already have a starting point for GPS data points: less than twenty-eight 
days.127 However, this twenty-eight day period may not be applicable to 
electronic communications; the courts are free to establish the mosaic 
thresholds for electronic media the way they best see fit. Differing forms of 
electronic communication can reveal differing amounts of personal 
information, and courts should have the flexibility to determine the mosaic 
threshold for each of these different forms. Courts will define the lower limit 
of these thresholds when the appropriate cases arrive.  
This broad standard is a benefit of the mosaic theory. The flexibility of 
standards explains their continued success and application. The reasonable 
person changes as society changes; similarly, the mosaic threshold can change 
as technology changes. Without a bright line, courts have the flexibility to 
define different mosaic thresholds for different types of data. It might take 
1,000 text messages to develop a mosaic but only 200 emails—courts will 
define these thresholds through litigation. The result is a flexible, broad 
standard, and this is preferable to a bright-line rule.  
                                                                                                                     
Graham, the Fourth Circuit originally found that fourteen days of surveillance qualifies as 
an “extended period of time” and thus violates an individual’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy. United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 349–50 (4th Cir. 2015), adhered to in part 
on reh’g en banc, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016). On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit found 
that three days’ worth of GPS data points does not violate an individual’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 780 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 122 See Steven M. Bellovin et al., When Enough Is Enough: Location Tracking, Mosaic 
Theory, and Machine Learning, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 555, 556 (2014) (discussing the 
use of “machine learning” to quantify when the aggregation of information constitutes a 
mosaic); Kerr, supra note 38, at 333 (discussing the problem of determining what should 
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guidance for what constitutes a mosaic).  
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173–74 (5th ed. 1984).  
 124 See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.17, at 489 (4th ed. 2004). 
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 126 See supra Part II.A.  
 127 See Simmons, supra note 28, at 263. 
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3. Applying the Mosaic Theory to Traditional Communications 
If the Court adopts the mosaic theory, would it apply to all third-party 
communications? This question is fair, particularly because this Note criticizes 
the Quon and Warshak proposal due to the problems it poses when applied to 
traditional third-party communications.128 However, several differences 
distinguish the Quon and Warshak framework from the mosaic theory. 
First, from a practical perspective, the mosaic theory will most likely 
never apply to traditional forms of communication. Rarely will law 
enforcement have the ability to aggregate enough traditional, non-electronic 
information for the mosaic theory to apply.129  
Secondly, the mosaic theory is a new doctrine that has no place in prior 
jurisprudence, and the Court has indicated that the Fourth Amendment should 
treat large amounts of information differently in today’s world.130 Therefore, if 
the Court wishes to use the mosaic theory as a special rule only applicable to 
electronic communications, it can do so. This is unlike the Quon and Warshak 
solution because that solution attempts to extend an established doctrine that 
applies to non-digital forms of communication like mail and phone 
conversations. 
V. CONCLUSION 
“Courts and commentators have for years begun to acknowledge the 
increasing tension, wrought by our technological age, between the third-party 
doctrine and the primacy Fourth Amendment doctrine grants our society’s 
expectations of privacy.”131 
 
The Fourth Amendment and technology have not progressed at the same 
rate. The advances in technology have far outpaced Fourth Amendment 
development in the digital age. This has resulted in an undeniable tension 
between Fourth Amendment protection and technology.  
Because of this tension, courts have struggled to provide Fourth 
Amendment protection for digital communications. Some courts strictly apply 
the third-party doctrine. Other courts have made bold (but misguided) attempts 
to reform the Fourth Amendment analysis. 
In recent Fourth Amendment decisions, the Supreme Court has suggested 
that the size of information matters. Applying the mosaic theory to digital 
communications addresses this concern. Further, this solution strikes the 
                                                                                                                     
 128 See supra Part III.B.2. 
 129 See supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing limits of traditional surveillance).  
 130 See supra Part IV.B.2 (examining recent Supreme Court discussions of large 
amounts of information). 
 131 United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 360 (4th Cir. 2015), adhered to in part on 
reh’g en banc, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016). 
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appropriate balance between strictly applying the third-party doctrine and 
overextending the address/content distinction to protect privacy rights. 
The mosaic theory is not without flaws. However, the test provides a 
flexible, broad standard that gives courts the ability to shape the test over time. 
The Supreme Court is not an institution that has traditionally avoided tough 
problems, and now—in the middle of a debate about the future role of the 
Fourth Amendment—is not the time to start. For the sake of privacy, the Court 
should rise to this challenge and apply the mosaic theory to digital 
communications.  
